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Abstract
Pervasive computing and the increasing networking needs
usually demand from publishing data without revealing sen-
sible information. Among several data protection methods
proposed in the literature, those based on linear regression
are widely used for numerical data. However, no attempts
have been made to study the effect of using more complex
polynomial regression methods. In this paper, we present
PoROP-k, a family of anonymizing methods able to protect a
data set using polynomial regressions. We show that PoROP-k
not only reduces the loss of information, but it also obtains
a better level of protection compared to previous proposals
based on linear regressions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive computing together with the use of the Internet is
becoming very popular in a lot of business and research areas.
In this situation, publicly accessible networks are populated
with large amounts of sensible information that needs to be
protected. Thus, privacy becomes a priority. Surveys show that
most of web users are unwilling to provide conﬁdential data
to a web site unless privacy protection measures are provided
[2].
A wide range of anonymizing methods have been proposed
in the literature. The goal of these methods is to ensure an ac-
ceptable level of protection of the conﬁdential data preserving
their statistical utility. Good surveys about protection methods
may be found in [1], [8].
In [8], the anonymizing methods are classiﬁed into two
different categories depending on how they use the original
values: synthetic data generators and perturbative protection
methods. Synthetic data generators exclusively use the original
data to build a model that is later used to build a new data
set. Perturbative protection methods are based on the addition
of noise into the original data set in order to make it difﬁcult
for an intruder to discover the original values.
Linear regression models are commonly used to anonymize
data. Two examples of this kind are the Information Preserving
Statistical Obfuscation (IPSO) [4], a synthetic data generator,
and the methods included in the LiROP-k family [10]. The
latter include both perturbative protection and synthetic data
generation, and were developed to solve some drawbacks of
IPSO. However, to our knowledge, more complex regression
methods have not been presented in the literature.
In this paper, we study a new family of methods called
PoROP-k, that make it possible to protect conﬁdential data by
using more complex regression models. We show in our exper-
iments that increasing the complexity of the regression model,
PoROP-k methods outperform LiROP-k methods (which are a
particular case of the family of methods included in PoROP-k),
when the score, a standard measure to compare protection
methods deﬁned in [7], is used to compare both methods.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II depicts
the protection scenario assumed in this work. In Section III,
we present our protection method using polynomial regression.
Then, Section IV describes the experiments done. Finally, the
paper draws some conclusions and a description of future
work.
II. PRIVACY PROTECTION SCENARIO
Before presenting our proposal, we ﬁrst present the protec-
tion scenario assumed in this work.
The main objective of a protection method is to anonymize a
data set. A data set can be viewed as a ﬁle containing a number
of records, where each record contains a set of attributes of
an individual. The attributes in the original data set can be
classiﬁed into two different categories, depending on their
capability to identify unique individuals, as follows:
• Identiﬁers. The identiﬁer attributes are used to identify
the individual unambiguously. A typical example of iden-
tiﬁer is the passport number.
Identifiers
Non-confidential
quasi-identifier
attributes
(Original)
Id Y
Non-confidential
quasi-identifier
attributes
(Protected)
Y’ X
Confidential
quasi-identifier
attributes
Fig. 1. Re-identiﬁcation scenario.
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Fig. 2. PoROP-k protection schema.
• Quasi-identiﬁers. A quasi-identiﬁer attribute is an at-
tribute that is not able to identify a single individual
when it is used alone. However, when it is combined with
other quasi-identiﬁer attributes, they can uniquely identify
an individual. Among the quasi-identiﬁer attributes, we
distinguish between conﬁdential and non-conﬁdential, de-
pending on whether they contain conﬁdential information.
An example of non-conﬁdential quasi-identiﬁer attribute
would be the postal code, while a conﬁdential quasi-
identiﬁer might be the salary.
When a data set is protected, identiﬁers are removed or
encrypted to prevent an intruder to re-identify individuals
easily. Typically, the remaining attributes are released, some of
them protected. In this paper, we assume that non-conﬁdential
attributes are protected, while conﬁdential attributes are not.
This allows third parties to have precise information on
conﬁdential data without revealing to whom that conﬁdential
data belongs to.
In this scenario, as shown in Figure 1, an intruder might
try to re-identify individuals by obtaining the non-conﬁdential
quasi-identiﬁer data (Y ) together with identiﬁers (Id) from
other data sources. Applying record linkage between the
protected attributes (Y ′) and the same attributes obtained from
other data sources (Y ), the intruder might be able to re-identify
a percentage of the protected individuals together with their
conﬁdential data (X). This is what protection methods try to
prevent.
III. METHOD DESCRIPTION
Analogously to LiROP-k methods, Polynomial Regression
on Ordered Partitions (PoROP-k) methods pre-process the
original data using a sequence of basics steps, namely (i) vec-
torization, (ii) sorting, (iii) partitioning and (iv) normalization.
The whole anonymizing process is depicted in Figure 2. There
are several aspects that motivate these steps:
• Vectorization. The main idea of this ﬁrst step is to gather
all the values in the data set in a single vector, inde-
pendently of the attribute they belong to. Consequently,
we are ignoring the attribute semantics and, therefore, all
possible relations, like covariance or correlations among
the attributes in the data set.
• Sorting. The second step is to sort all the vectorized
values. This step is necessary in order to ﬁt the data into a
model easily, sorting the values in non-decreasing order.
Note that sorting the values is a way of adding noise
itself. Note also that, performing this step, we are not
losing information as we will see later in the results.
• Partitioning. Even taking into account that data is sorted,
using a unique model to ﬁt all the data is unfeasible
because the error of the model might be very large. In
order to improve the accuracy, the sorted vectorized data
is split into several k-partitions, where k is the number of
values per partition. When all the pre-process steps are
ﬁnished, a different model regression will be used to ﬁt
the data of each partition. Therefore, modifying the value
of k, PoROP-k methods allow us to tune the accuracy of
the regression model by changing the size of the partition
being ﬁtted. Note that if the data set was not sorted, k
would not have this property.
• Normalization. Since the range of the values in the
different attributes could differ signiﬁcantly among them,
it might happen that the sorting step does not merge all
the attributes appropriately. For this reason, it is necessary
to normalize the data. There are many ways to normalize
a data set. A possible solution would be to normalize each
attribute independently before the application of the vec-
torization step. However, this normalization method could
present problems with skewed attributes and, therefore,
the attributes could not be merged in the sorting step.
For this reason, we propose to normalize the data stored
in each partition independently. This way, similar values
are put in the same partition and, therefore, the chances
to avoid the effect of skewness in the data are higher.
Note that, once data is normalized, vectorization, sorting
and partitioning steps have to be repeated a second time. This
step allows mixing values of different attributes independently
from their domain.
Formally speaking, let D be the original data set to be
protected. We denote by R the number of records in D. Each
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Fig. 3. Example of different regression curves on a set of points from a partition and the more probable intervals for the protected values when noise is
added independently.
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Fig. 4. Example of different regression curves on a set of points from a partition and the more probable interval for the protected values when noise is
added taking into account the original value.
record consists of a numerical attributes or ﬁelds. We assume
that none of the registers contain blanks. We denote by N the
total number of values in D. As a consequence, N = R · a.
Let V be a vector of size N containing the data values. First,
V is sorted increasingly. Let us denote by Vs the ordered vector
of size N containing the sorted data and vi the ith element of
vector Vs, where 0 ≤ i < N .
Next, Vs is divided into smaller sub-vectors or partitions.
Then, each sub-vector is normalized into the [0, 1] interval and
they are all sorted and partitioned again. As we said before,
we formally deﬁne k, where 1 < k ≤ N , as the number of
values per partition. Note that, if k is not a divisor of N the
last partition will contain a smaller number of values. Let P
be the number of k-partitions. We call r the number of values
in the last partition where 0 ≤ r < k. Therefore, N = kP +r.
If r > 0, we have P +1 partitions. We denote by Pm the mth
partition.
Let vm,n be deﬁned as the nth element of Pm:{
vm,n := vmk+n n = 0 . . . k − 1 m = 0 . . . P − 1
vP,n := vPk+n n = 0 . . . r − 1
For each Pm, a regression model is computed over the
following (x, y) points:
(0 , vm,0) (1 , vm,1) · · · (k − 1 , vm,(k−1))
When r > 0, the size of the last partition (PP ) is r < k. In
this case, the regression model of this partition is computed
differently: the nearest last k points of the data set are used to
compute the regression model, but only the r points held by
PP are actually protected. This guarantees that each regression
model is computed using the same number of points, so the
level of accuracy is homogeneous. Therefore, in this case, the
ﬁtting for the last partition is computed over the following
(x, y) points:
(0 , vm,N−k) (1 , vm,N−k+1) · · · (k − 1 , vm,N−1)
Finally, when the regression model is computed, PoROP-k
methods add Gaussian noise to the polynomial regression to
partially change the order of the points. With the addition of
noise, it will be more difﬁcult for an intruder to reveal the
original data even knowing the values of some attributes.
Similarly to LiROP-k methods, PoROP-k methods may be
considered both a protection method and a synthetic data
generator depending on the way used to add noise. If the
Gaussian noise is computed independently of the original
value to protect, PoROP-k methods can be considered syn-
thetic data generators. We call this set of methods PoROPs-k.
An example of three different regression curves computed on
the same data set using different polynomial complexity is
described in Figure 3. On the other hand, if the noise addition
is dependent on the point to be protected, PoROP-k methods
must be considered perturbative. In this latter case, we call
this methods set PoROPp-k. An example of these is presented
in Figure 4. More details about noise addition methods based
on linear regression models can be found in [10].
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Fig. 5. Equations to model a data set using quadratic regression.
Following, we present the formulae to compute PoROP-k
methods using linear and quadratic regressions. Although for-
mulas for cubic regressions are used later in the experiments,
the details about them are omitted in this paper for the sake
of simplicity.
A. PoROP-k using linear regression
Assuming that the resulting linear regression which models
the data is lm,n = βmn + αm (where n = 0 . . . k − 1), then
the expressions used to compute βm and αm are as follows:
βm =
2
k(k + 1)
[
−3
k−1∑
n=0
vm,n +
6
k − 1
k−1∑
n=1
n vm,n
]
αm =
2
k(k + 1)
[
(2k − 1)
k−1∑
n=0
vm,n − 3
k−1∑
n=1
n vm,n
]
These results can be derived from the normal equations as
presented in [5].
Note that, as mentioned before, when linear regression is
used to model the data in each partition, PoROP-k methods
can be reduced to LiROP-k methods, since this last subset is
a particular case of our proposal.
B. PoROP-k using quadratic regression
However, as mentioned previously, PoROP-k methods allow
to use more complex models. In this subsection we present the
equations used to build a quadratic model, assuming that the
resulting quadratic regression is lm,n = γmn2 + βmn + αm
(where n = 0 . . . k − 1). Speciﬁcally, the expressions used
to compute γm, βm and αm are presented in Figure 5.
Analogously to the linear regression, these results can be
derived from the normal equations.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In Section III, we have presented the PoROP-k protection
methods, which protect a data set combining a new vision
of the data to be protected with a complex pre-processing
process and a model regression. In this section, we describe
a set of experiments that allows us to test the new set of
methods presented in this paper and compare them to LiROP-k
methods.
A. Data
For evaluation purposes, we have considered the two ref-
erence data sets proposed in the CASC project [3]. The ﬁrst
has been extracted using the Data Extraction System (DES)
from the U. S. Census Bureau [6], called Census. The second
has been obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Authority
[9], called EIA.
The Census data set contains 1080 records consisting of 13
attributes (which is equal to 14040 values to be protected). The
EIA data set, after removing the identiﬁers and the categorical
attributes, contains 4092 records consisting of 5 attributes. The
total number of values to be protected in this data set is equal
to 20460. For the experiments we assume that the intruder
knows 7 out of the 13 attributes in the Census data set and 3
out of 5 attributes in the EIA data set.
B. Measures
We calculate the score, a typical general measure used
to compare different protection methods [8], to evalu-
ate PoROP-k methods. We also use this score to com-
pare PoROP-k methods with LiROP-k methods.
In order to calculate the score, we use the measures pre-
sented in previous work:
• Information Loss (IL): Let X and X ′ be matrices
representing the original and the protected data set, re-
spectively. Let V and R be the covariance matrix and the
correlation matrix of X , respectively; let X be the vector
of variable averages for X and let S be the diagonal
of V . Deﬁne V ′, R′,X
′
, and S′ analogously from X ′.
The information loss is computed by averaging the mean
variations of X−X ′,V −V ′,S−S′, and the mean absolute
error of R−R′ and multiplying the resulting average by
100. All these measures have been extracted from [8] and
are computed in the same way.
• Disclosure Risk (DR): We use the three different meth-
ods presented in [11] in order to evaluate DR: (i) Distance
Linkage Disclosure risk (DLD), which is the average
percentage of linked records using distance based record
linkage, (ii) Probabilistic Linkage Disclosure risk (PLD),
which is the average percentage of linked records us-
ing probabilistic based record linkage and (iii) Interval
Disclosure risk (ID) which is the average percentage of
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Fig. 6. Average results of Information Loss (a), Disclosure Risk (b) and Score for the Census data set.
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Fig. 7. Average results of Information Loss (a), Disclosure Risk (b) and Score for the Census data set.
original values falling into the intervals around their cor-
responding masked values. The three values are computed
over the number of attributes that the intruder is assumed
to know that, in our case, ranges from one to half of the
attributes. These measures have been extracted from [8]
and are computed in the same way:
DR = 0.25DLD + 0.25PLD + 0.5 ID
• Score: A ﬁnal score measure is computed by weighting
the presented measures, also proposed in [8]:
score = 0.5 IL + 0.5DR
C. Results
In order to understand whether using more complex re-
gression methods allows us to preserve the information more
accurately, we ﬁrst study the information loss of each method.
We test PoROPs-k and PoROPp-k methods using linear,
quadratic and cubic regressions. The range of values for the
number of points per partition k has been deﬁned in order to
test a wide spectrum of cases ranging from low IL values to
cases where the IL is high. Since the distribution of values in
each data set is different, values of k are chosen speciﬁcally
for each one, namely, for the Census data set k ranges from
2000 to 10000, while it ranges from 4000 to 18000 for the
EIA data set.
We execute each conﬁguration ﬁve times performing 510
tests in total. The average IL, DR and Score values for each
conﬁguration are presented in Figures 6 and 7. Tables I and II
show the detail of the scores obtained from the experiments.
Note that the ﬁgures and tables presented in this section only
show the results using the synthetic version (PoROPs-k). The
results obtained by PoROPp-k are almost identical and are
omitted for the sake of simplicity.
In general, being able to control the IL is important,
specially when we are interested in keeping the statistics
in the protected data set. As we can see in Figure 6.(a)
and Figure 7.(a), PoROP-k methods present a strong relation
between IL and the value of parameter k. Usually, when
parameter k increases, IL increases. Note that this can be
observed independently of the model regression and the data
set. In our case, the pre-processing phase is very important to
guarantee this strong relation, since by vectorizing, ordering,
partitioning and normalizing PoROPp-k makes it possible to
ﬁnd a regression model that accurately ﬁts the data set.
Observing the same ﬁgures, we can see that the more
complex the polynomial model, the lower the information loss.
This happens because by increasing the complexity of the
regression function, we also increase the ﬁtting capabilities
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Census
Linear Quadratic Cubic
(LiROP − k)
2000 42.1 42.2 42.3
3000 41.3 41.8 42.0
4000 40.3 41.9 42.0
5000 37.6 41.1 41.6
6000 42.1 41.4 41.9
7000 40.9 31.9 35.5
8000 41.1 34.0 37.6
9000 51.6 36.0 41.1
10000 61.5 40.4 42.9
TABLE I
AVERAGE SCORES FOR THE PoROPs-k METHODS USING THE CENSUS
DATA SET.
EIA
Linear Quadratic Cubic
(LiROP − k)
4000 36.7 40.9 39.5
6000 36.1 39.1 38.0
8000 34.0 35.2 35.6
10000 33.8 33.3 35.1
12000 43.4 33.0 33.7
14000 52.1 39.9 34.3
16000 40.7 38.1 33.2
18000 69.4 38.3 33.2
TABLE II
AVERAGE SCORES FOR THE PoROPs-k METHODS USING THE EIA DATA
SET.
of the complex polynomial models.
A decrease in the information loss typically implies an
increase in the disclosure risk. Figures 6.(b) and 7.(b) present
the evolution of the disclosure risk as a function of k. We
can observe that, as the complexity of the regression model
increases, PoROP-k methods present a larger DR. However,
as it follows, the overall decrease on the information loss
compensate for the increase on the disclosure risk. This is
shown in Figures 6.(c) and 7.(c), where we can observe that
the score values obtained by quadratic and cubic regression
models are in general lower than the values obtained by the
linear regression models. This effect is more clear when par-
titions have a large number of points. In these cases PoROP-k
methods outperform the results obtained by LiROP-k methods
due to their greater ﬁtting capabilities. Tables I and II show
that, increasing the complexity of the regression functions, we
achieve better quality in the protection. Speciﬁcally, in the
Census data set, the best scores are obtained using quadratic
regression (31.9), while the best scores using linear regres-
sions are 37.6. Analogously, using the EIA data set the best
scores are obtained using cubic regressions instead of linear
regressions.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a generalization of the
LiROP-k anonymizing methods, called PoROP-k methods. We
have shown that the complexity of the regression model used
to protect data is a relevant parameter and affects the overall
quality of the protection method. In general, we have seen
that, by making the model more complex, we can improve
the quality of the protection method. Also, our new class
of methods allows us to control the information loss by
modifying the k parameter.
As future work, we plan to ﬁnd new criteria to decide which
is the best regression model for each partition in order to
minimize the information loss preserving the disclosure risk
as low as possible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors from UPC want to thank Generalitat de
Catalunya for its support through grant number GRE-00352
and Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia of Spain for its support
through grant TIN2006-15536-C02-02. Jordi Nin wants to
thank the Spanish Council for Scientiﬁc Research (CSIC) for
his I3P grant.
REFERENCES
[1] Adam, N. R., Wortmann, J. C., (1989), Security-Control for statistical
databases: a comparative study. ACM Computing Surveys, Volume: 21,
515-556.
[2] Ackerman, M., Faith Cranor, L., Reagle, J., (1999), Privacy in e-
commerce: examining user scenarios and privacy preferences, EC ’99:
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce, ACM
Press, ISBN: 1-58113-176-3, Pages: 1–8.
[3] Brand, R., Domingo-Ferrer, J., and Mateo-Sanz, J. M., (2002) Ref-
erence datasets to test and compare sdc methods for protection
of numerical microdata. European Project IST-2000-25069 CASC,
http://neon.vb.cbs.nl/casc.
[4] Burridge, J., (2003), Information preserving statistical obfuscation.
Statistics and Computing, Volume: 13, 321-327.
[5] Dahlquist, G., Bjo¨rck, A., (2003), Numerical methods, Mineola, Dover
Publications.
[6] Data Extraction System, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/
[7] Domingo-Ferrer, J., Torra, V., (2001), Disclosure Control Methods and
Information Loss for Microdata, Conﬁdentiality, Disclosure, and Data
Access: Theory and Practical Applications for Statistical Agencies,
Elsevier Science, 91-110.
[8] Domingo-Ferrer, J., Torra, V., (2001), A Quantitative Comparison of
Disclosure Control Methods for Microdata, Conﬁdentiality, Disclosure,
and Data Access: Theory and Practical Applications for Statistical
Agencies, Elsevier Science, 111-133.
[9] U.S. Energy Information Authority, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
[10] Medrano-Gracia, P., Pont-Tuset, J., Nin, J., Munte´s-Mulero, V., (2007),
Ordered Data Set Vectorization for Linear Regression on Data Privacy,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer. To be published.
[11] Torra, V., Domingo-Ferrer, J., (2003), Record linkage methods for
multidatabase data mining, Information Fusion in Data Mining, Springer,
101-132.
34
